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Note: Proper Venue for an Action When at Least
One Defendant Is an Officer or Employee
of the Federal Government
I. INTRODUCTION
As suits by individuals seeking judicial review of federal administrative decisions have become more prevalent, commentators have given increased emphasis to analysis of the problems
that stand in the way of actions against officers and employees
of the federal government. The articles which have appeared in
the last several years have focused primarily on the problems
caused by the remains of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,1
on the kinds of relief available in an action against a federal
defendant,2 and on the standing of parties to raise controversies
and the ability of the courts to resolve them. 3 The purpose of
this Note is to focus on a fourth area, one which has been neglected recently in legal journals, 4 but which has generated a
great deal of litigation: that of the proper venue for an action
in which at least one defendant is a government officer.
For the last eleven years, venue for suits against a federal
defendant has been controlled by the liberalized venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). 5 Since the adoption of Section
1. See, e.g., Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity,
Subject Matter Jurisdiction,and Parties Defendant, 68 Micr L. REv. 389
(1970).
2. See, e.g., Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and
Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal
Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REv. 308 (1967); Jacoby, The Effect of
Recent Changes in the Law of "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review, 53 GEO.
L.J. 19 (1964).
3. See, e.g., Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHL
L. REV. 450 (1970); Dugan, Standing to Sue: A Commentary On Injury
In Fact, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 256 (1971); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84
HARv. L. REV.633 (1971).
4. Both Byse & Fiocca, supra note 2, and Jacoby, supra note 2,
discuss the problems of venue for actions against federal defendants
prior to 1962 and outline, as does Cramton, supra note 1, how the
problems were to be solved by the adoption of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) as
part of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962; but none of the articles
discusses the case law generated by section 1391(e). An Annotation,
9 A.L.R. Fed. 719 (1971), lists some of the earlier cases decided under
the statute but makes no attempt to analyze them.
5. For text of the statute, see note 36 infra.
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1391(e) as part of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,0 there
has been continual controversy as to whether there are limitations
to the availability of the broad venue provisions that are not
apparent on the face of the statute. This Note will first briefly
summarize the origin of Section 1391(e) with emphasis placed
upon the historical problems blocking the suit of government officers in a convenient jurisdiction that the statute was designed
to correct. It will then analyze the case law discussing whether
the statute extends to cases other than the prototype situation
in which a plaintiff, having a substantial complaint against a
government officer residing outside of the District of Columbia,
is unable to join an indispensable superior officer in the District
of Columbia because of lack of proper venue and personal jurisdiction. It is the thesis of this Note that the narrow reading afforded Section 1391(e) by several courts is undesirable.
II. BACKGROUND
Whereas the limitations on the jurisdiction of a federal court
represent limitations on its power to adjudicate certain kinds of
controversies and on its ability to force parties to abide by its
adjudication, the federal venue provisions attempt to use the
relative convenience of the litigants and witnesses as the criterion for choosing which court of competent jurisdiction should
actually try a suit.7 The choice as to the relative convenience
of a forum has been made by Congress for all cases, and thus,
although a court has limited discretion to transfer an action to
"any other district or division where it might have been
brought," s proper venue is fixed by statute. Until the passage
6. Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744.
7. See, e.g., Denver & R.G.W. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 569 (1967); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).

One court has attempted to describe the

difference between jurisdiction and venue as the difference between
considerations of fairness and convenience: the rules governing jurisdiction are to assure that the defendant has enough contact with a
forum so that it is fair to make him answer there, whereas the rules of
venue and of discretionary transfer are to assure that the forum in

which the action was brought is not so inconvenient as to require that
the suit be tried in some other forum of competent jurisdiction. Time,
Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 1966).

See generally

Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions For Reform, 7 VAND. L. REv. 608 (1954).
8. A court has the power to transfer an action to "any other district or division where it might have been brought" if the transfer is
for "the convenience of parties and witnesses" and is "in the interest
of justice," 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970), but the Supreme Court has in-
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of the Mandamus and Venue Act, proper venue in an action
against a federal defendant was determined solely by the appropriate "general" federal venue statute. 10 Although an action in

the federal courts based solely on diversity of citizenship could
be maintained in the district of residence of either the plaintiff
or the defendant, an action against a government employee sued
in his official capacity almost always presented a federal question. Proper venue for federal question suits was limited to the
district of the defendant's residence."
A. SOiE PROBLEMS PRIOR TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
MVANDAMUS AND VENm ACT

The restriction of proper venue to the district of the de-

fendant's residence in federal question actions created an undue
burden on the plaintiff when the defendant was either a corporation or a federal officer. Prior to 1948, proper venue for an
action against a corporate defendant lay only in its state of incorporation even though a court in any other state in which the
terpreted "in any district . . . where it might have been brought" to
restrict transfer to districts in which venue would have been proper
had the suit been initiated there originally. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363
U.S. 335 (1960).
9. See, e.g., Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340
(1953): "The requirement of venue is specific and unambiguous; it
is not one of those vague principles which, in the interest of some overriding policy, is to be given a 'liberal' construction."
10. The general federal venue statute was adopted as part of the
Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552 (errors introduced in the
printing of the 1887 Act were corrected by the Act of August 13, 1888,
ch- 866. 25 Stat. 443). As amended, the provisions are codified as
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(b) (1970).
11. The Act of 1887 amended the venue provisions adopted as part
of the Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875), which in essence made venue proper in any district in which the defendant could
be served with process. There is nothing in the legislative history of
the Act of 1887 to suggest why the venue provisions were changed.
However, courts have assumed that "abuses engendered by this extensive venue" (Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561,
563 (1942)) prompted amendments which had as their purpose to "save
defendants from inconveniences to which they might be subjected"
by venue provisions which compelled a defendant to answer in any district in which he could be served with process. General Inv. Co. v.
Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 275 (1922). Thus, the basis for
the interpretation given the general federal venue statute is that venue
is a means of protecting the defendant against suit in a distant forum.
In 1966 the general federal venue statutes were amended by the
Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89-714, 80 Stat. 1111, which allowed both
diversity and federal question actions to be maintained in the district
in which the "claim arose."
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corporation did business would have personal jurisdiction over
it. 1 2 The effect of so restricting proper venue was to make it
impossible to force a corporation to accept venue outside of its
state of incorporation 3 at a time when the interstate activities
14
of corporations were rapidly expanding.
A similar, but more complex, problem was presented when
the defendant was a federal officer sued in his official capacity.
If the action named only a local subordinate government employee, the plaintiff was often faced with the possibility that the
subordinate's ultimate superior would be ruled to be an indispensable party and the action dismissed without his joinder.15
The indispensable superior problem had two aspects: 1) the
superior was not usually amenable to service of process outside
of the District of Columbia and therefore a court in the field
lacked personal jurisdiction over him,' 6 and 2) even if personal
jurisdiction could be obtained, the superior could interpose the
general federal question venue statute that set venue only in the
district of the defendant's residence.1 7 In the case of the indispensable superior who was often an agency or department head,
the only proper venue was the district of the agency or department headquarters, which in almost every case was located in
Washington, D.C.
Despite repeated Supreme Court attempts at clarification,
there was hopeless confusion as to exactly when a superior offi12.

Prior to the adoption of the "general" federal venue provisions

in 1887, a corporation could be forced to accept venue in any state in

which it had appointed an agent in compliance with a state-imposed
requirement for the privilege of doing local business. See Ex parte
Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1877).

13. In one
infringement of
District of New
under the laws

case, the Supreme Court ruled that an action alleging
trade mark could not be maintained in the Southern
York when the defendant corporation was incorporated
of Massachusetts even though the defendant's principal
place of business was located in New York City. In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U.S. 221 (1895).

This doctrine was partially abrogated in

Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939),
and by the amendment of the federal venue statute in 1948.
14. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S.
165, 170 (1939).
15. See, e.g., Martinez v. Seaton, 285 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1961);
McNeil v. Leonard, 199 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1961).

16. See, e.g., Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952); Butterworth v. Hill, 114 U.S. 128 (1885); Stroud v. Benson, 254 F.2d 448 (4th
Cir. 1958).

17. In actions against federal officers sued in their official capacity, residence meant official residence. See, e.g., Smith v. Farley, 38 F.
Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
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cer was indispensable. 18 It was sometimes possible to enjoin a
local officer from enforcing a superior's decision if in making
the decision the superior had exceeded his statutory authority."9
But it was almost never possible to force a subordinate to lease
federal land 20 or reinstate a discharged federal employee,2 even
though the superior had nothing to do with the actual decision.
However, these were the administrative determinations most frequently involved in litigation.
The problem of the indispensable superior was exacerbated
by the rulings in two early Supreme Court cases which, when
read together, held that only the District Court for the District
of Columbia had the original subject matter jurisdiction necessary to issue writs of mandamus.2 2 Because effective judicial
review of federal administrative decisions often required that
mandamus issue,23 the restriction of mandamus power to the Dis18. See generally, Davis, Government Officers as Defendants: Two
Troublesome Problems, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1955); Developments in
the Law-Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70
HAZv. L.REv. 827, 924-28 (1957).
19. But see Paolo v. Garfinkel, 200 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1952), where
the court refused to review a deportation order when the Commissioner
of Immigration and Naturalization Service was not a party because
any relief ordered would be effective only in the state in which the
court ordering the relief sat. Several years later, the Supreme Court
overruled the Peolo decision in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48
(1955), in which it stressed the hardship of making an alien travel to
Washington to challenge his deportation.
20. See, e.g., McNeil v. Leonard, 199 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1961).
21. See, e.g., Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952).
22. In MeIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813), the Supreme Court held that Congress had never granted the lower federal
courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. However, in
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), the
Court ruled that mandamus was one of the common law powers retained by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
which had been given the powers of the court of the State of Maryland
when the District was created from land donated by Maryland in 1801.
23. Alternately, a plaintiff could request injunctive or declaratory relief. But if he wanted to force the defendant to perform some
positive act, e.g., to lease him land or to reinstate him in a government
position from which he had been dismissed, a request for an injunction
was treated as a request for a mandatory injunction which many courts
thought of as similar in all 'essential respects to mandamus and therefore would not order it. See, e.g., Johnson v. Interstate Power Co.,
187 F. Supp. 36 (D.S.D. 1960); Callaway County Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Comm. v. Missouri Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Comm., 122 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Bell v. Hood,
71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947). But see Bowles v. Skaggs, 151 F.2d
817 (6th Cir. 1945). Furthermore, a declaratory judgment was not sufficient because it did not by itself command the federal officer to perform the requested action. Marshall v. Crotty, 185 F.2d 622 (1st Cir.
1950).
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trict Court for the District of Columbia frequently meant that
an administrative determination could be challenged only there.
Thus, whether or not a superior residing in Washington was an
indispensable party, relief in a court more convenient for the
plaintiff than that for the District of Columbia was often not
possible.
These problems are well illustrated by the case of Richman
v. Beck 24 in which the plaintiff, alleging that he had been improperly denied a permit to trail his sheep over public land,
brought an action against local range management officials seeking, inter alia, a mandatory injunction commanding the issuance
of a permit for crossing public lands. The trial court ordered
that the permit be issued, but the Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit reversed. Even though the actual decision as to whom
a permit would be issued was made by the local range manager
in conjunction with an advisory board of local land owners, the
court held that the Secretary of the Interior was an indispensable
party. The court reached its decision of indispensability because the statute which provided for the issuance of trailing permitS2 5 vested "the power to grant to owners of land adjacent
to a grazing district ... rights of way over lands included in the
district . . .in the Secretary of the Interior. ' '20 Since joinder
of the Secretary was not possible because of lack of proper
venue and personal jurisdiction over him, the action had to be
dismissed. But even had the Secretary appeared voluntarily
and waived objection to improper venue, it is doubtful that
the court could have granted effective relief without the power
to order mandamus. In demanding a permit, 2 7 plaintiff attempted to force the defendant to perform a duty allegedly
owed to him. That, traditionally, could not be done without mandanUS.

28

B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MANDAIVIUS AND VENUE ACT
The legislative history of the bill which was to become the
24. 257 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1958).
25. 43 U.S.C. § 315 et seq. (1970).
26. 257 F.2d at 579.
27. Although several remedies were requested, the plaintiff ar-

gued that he primarily desired a judgment restraining local officials
of the Bureau of Land Management from interfering with his trailing

rights. However, the court concluded that without a permit, the plaintiff had no right to trail his sheep. Id. Therefore, 'effective relief
would have required the court to order the secretary to issue a permit.
28. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 is relatively sparse.20 As originally introduced by Representative Budge of Idaho, the bill
attempted to circumvent the problem of the indispensable superior by amending the federal question venue provisions so as
to allow an action against a federal officer sued in his official
capacity to be maintained in the district of the plaintiff's residence.3 0 Reintroduced in the next Congress, 3' the bill succumbed
to the Department of Justice's objection that expanding venue

for actions against federal defendants would not alone facilitate
judicial review of administrative action because the district
courts in the field would still lack the power to issue writs of
mandamus. Therefore, although the district courts would be
able to hear the suits, they would be unable to give effective relief.32

In response to the criticisms of the Justice Department,

a new draft of the bill was introduced. The draft empowered
the district courts with "original jurisdiction of any action to
compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform his duty.133 Reintroduced in the next Congress, and subjected to minor modifications in the Senate, 34 the
bill became law on October 5, 1962. The mandamus portion of
29. There was no debate on either the House or Senate floor. See
generally Byse & Fiocca, supra note 2. Much of the following history
of the Act closely follows the discussion of Professor Byse.
30. H.R. 10892, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Service of process on
the absent superior was to be effectuated by service on the local
United States Attorney or his designee.
31. H.P 10089, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
32. Letter from Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General, to
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, undated, in E.R. REP.
No. 1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1960). The Department of Justice
also recommended that service of process by registered mail be made
on the Attorney General and on the officer being sued.
33. HR.12622, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). A suggestion by the
Judicial Conference of the United States that venue also be made
proper in the district in which the cause of action arose and in the
district in which any real property involved in the action was located
was also adopted. See Letter from Warren Olney, Director, to the
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, May 3, 1960, in H.R. REP.
No. 1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960).
34. In response to continued criticism from the Department of
Justice, the "jurisdictional" grant to the district courts was reworded so
as to clarify that the grant of jurisdiction to hear suits to compel federal defendants to perform their duties (mandamus power) did not give
the district courts the power to order a government officer to act contrary to his discretion. The venue section of the Act was also changed.
The liberalized venue provisions were made available only if there
was no specific venue for the action otherwise provided by law. The
provisions were also changed so that venue would be proper in the district of the plaintiff's residence only if there was no real property
involved in the action.

1012

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1005

the new act became 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The venue-service of
process section was codified as subsection (e) of the general federal venue statute 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
C.

SECTION 1391 (e)

As long as there was not already a "special" venue statute
controlling venue for the particular action, 35 Section 1391(e) provided four possible venues for any "civil action" in which "each
defendant" was either an agency of the United States sued by
name or "an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof acting in his official capacity. ' 30 Venue was
made proper in the district of the defendant's residence, as was
true under the general federal question venue statute. Additionally, venue was made proper in the district in which the claim
arose,3 7 and in the district in which any real property involved
in the action was located. But the most important feature that
distinguished the new venue provisions from the general federal question venue statute was that venue was also made proper
in the district of the plaintiff's residence if there was no real
property involved in the action. In addition, the statute provided
for extra-territorial service of process so as to enable a plaintiff
to bring an absent federal defendant before any court in which
venue would be proper.
Although the original bill clearly was prompted by the problems caused by the doctrine of the indispensable superior, the
language of Section 1391(e) was much broader than that which
would have been necessary to allow a plaintiff to proceed against
35. For a discussion of the "except as otherwise provided by law"
language, see text accompanying note 127 infra.
36. More fully set out, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) (1970) reads:
A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his
official capacity or under color of legal authority, or any agency
of the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by
law, be brought in any judicial district in which: (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose,
or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or
(4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the
action.
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be
served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the
officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by
certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in
which the action is brought.
37. Amendments in 1966 also made venue proper in the district
in which the claim arose under the general federal venue statute. See
note 11 supra.
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a subordinate officer in the field.38 The very breadth of the
language made it possible to interpret the venue provisions as if
they made proper venue for an action against a federal employee
turn primarily on the convenience of the plaintiff. Unfortunately, neither the House0 9 nor Senate Judiciary Committee reports40 made it clear whether Congress had intended such a

radical departure from the traditional conception of venue as protection for a defendant against suit in a distant forum.
On one hand, both the House and Senate reports recognized
that actions against government officers were in essence actions
against the United States which would be defended by a local
1
United States Attorney wherever the action was brought.'
They both concluded, therefore, that "[r]equiring the Government to defend Government officials and agencies in places other
than Washington would not appear to be a burdensome imposition. ' 42 The Senate report went on to suggest that venue provisions which required the citizen-plaintiff to bring his suit in a location convenient for the federal defendant was "to tailor our
judicial processes to the convenience of the Government rather
than to provide readily available, inexpensive judicial remedies
for the citizen who is aggrieved by the workings of Government" 43 Thus, at least part of the legislative history of the Mandamus and Venue Act, although certainly not inconsistent with
a narrow reading of the statute's purpose, can be and has been
read 4 4 to support the position that Congress considered the convenience of the federal defendant to be of only secondary importance.
On the other hand, both reports disclaimed any intention
that the Act was to give access to the federal courts for any action which could not already have been maintained in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.4" Since only
38. For example, Congress might have solved the problems created by the doctrine of the indispensable superior by making it unnecessary to join a superior who had not participated actively in the
making of the disputed determination, instead of amending venue provisions which seem to apply to all federal officers.
39. HLR. REP. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) [hereinafter
cited as LR. REP.].
40. S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited
as S. REP.].
41. Id. at 3; ELR. REP. at 3.
42. S. REP. at 3; MR. REP. at3.
43. S. REP. at 3.
44. See cases cited in note 82 infra.
45. S. REP. at 2; :ER. REP. at 2.
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the one specific problem of an indispensable superior residing in
Washington who was needed in a local action against a subordinate employee was before Congress, the disclaimer coupled
with the lack of any real affirmative evidence of a broader purpose suggests that the statute should be construed to apply only
to the prototype fact situation that led to its passage. Much of
the controversy generated by Section 1391(e) has turned on
whether or not the statute is to be interpreted so narrowly.
III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1391 (e)

The issues presented in the cases which have discussed
whether Section 1391(e) extends to fact situations other than
the prototype are roughly classifiable into five categories.4 0
46. An additional area of conflict which primarily involves the
interpretation to be given 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) concerning corporate
venue is beyond the scope of this note. The litigation in such cases
turns on whether the combination of sections 1391 (c) and (e) allows a
corporation to set venue for suits against federal defendants in any
district in which it does business. Underlying the issue is the question of whether the section 1391 (c) definition of corporate residence applies to a corporation as plaintiff as well as to a corporation as defendant. For a discussion of the section 1391 (c) aspects of the problem,
see Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1970);
for the problem in the section 1391 (e) context, see Abbott Laboratories
v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855 (D. Del. 1964). See also Annot., supra
note 4.
Another question which previously arose under section 1391 (e) has
subsided. It is now generally held that the statute gives a court personal jurisdiction over a federal defendant who cannot be served with
process within a district in which venue is proper. In its report, the
House Judiciary Committee explained that in order to give effect to
the broadened venue provisions of section 1391 (e), it was necessary to
modify the service of process requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure so as to allow for service beyond the territorial limits
of the state in which the action was brought. H.R. REP., supra note 39,
at 2. In United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.
1969), the only case to hold otherwise, the Second Circuit was apparently mislead by the classification of section 1391 (e) as a venue statute.
Less than a year later, the Second Circuit explained without mentioning Rudick that the purpose of section 1391 (e) was to broaden the venue
and service of process provisions "so that when a superior officer residing in Washington was a necessary party the action could still be
brought in the field, with personal jurisdiction over the superior obtainable by service of process by mail . . . ." Liberation News Service
v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1384 (2d Cir. 1970).
There is one line of cases, however, all decided by one judge of
the District Court for the Western District of Missouri, which holds
that section 1391(e) provides for extra-territorial service of process
only in petitions for writs of mandamus. The cases all involve one
prisoner's attempts to extract himself from a federal penitentiary.

Langston v. Ciccone, 313 F. Supp. 56 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Ott v. Ciccone,

19731

VENUE

1015

There has been conflict concerning: 1) whether the liberalized
venue provisions of the statute are available at all when a nonfederal defendant is joined in an action against a government
officer; 2) whether the venue provisions are available only in
actions against government employees who serve administrative
functions-e.g., against the head of an executive department and
not against a member of Congress; 3) whether the venue and
service of process provisions are available when an absent employee who is not a superior officer residing in Washington is
an indispensable party; 4) whether a plaintiff, by naming as a
nominal defendant a local officer who has not participated in
the disputed administrative determination, can use the "district
of the defendant's residence" provision to set venue in the district most convenient for himself; and 5) whether the liberalized
venue and, more importantly, the extra-territorial service of
process provisions of the statute are available in an action to obtain a writ of habeas corpus.
A.

AcTIONs IN WHicH AT LEAST ONE DEFENDANT IS

NOT A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE

The origin of the clause of Section 1391(e) which limits the
applicability of the statute to actions "in which each defendant
is an officer or employee of the United States" is something of a
mystery.47 Although there is no evidence in the legislative history to support his point of view, one commentator has speculated that the clause was inserted because the Department of
Justice preferred to have federal interests resolved in actions in
which it could maintain control over the joinder of related parties and issues.48 If "each defendant" is given its logical meaning
of every or aUl defendants, then absent a Justice Department
waiver, 49 Section 1391(e) cannot be used to set venue for any
defendant when federal and non-federal defendants are joined
in the same action.
Some courts, however, considered the interpretation urged
326 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Ott v. United States Board of Parole,
324 F. Supp. 1034 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
47. No mention of its origin was made in either the House or the
Senate reports.
48. See Cramton, supra note 1, at 463.
49. According to Professor Cramton, United States Attorneys are
told that they are not authorized to waive objections to third party
joinders without first obtaining clearance with the Department of Jus-

tice Civil Division which will in turn clear them with the agency involved. Cramton, supra note 1, at 463.
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by the Department of Justice to violate the "spirit and intent" of
what they felt was a plaintiff oriented statute. 50 They urged
that the effect of making Section 1391(e) unavailable was to
"whipsaw" the plaintiff out of his cause of action. If the extraterritorial service of process provision of the statute was not
available so as to make it possible to bring an action in the field
against both a government officer headquartered in Washington
and a non-federal defendant, there was often no jurisdiction in
which the plaintiff could proceed. Whereas the federal officer
was amenable to service of process only in the District of Columbia, the non-federal defendant was subject to suit only in an
outlying district. 51
Although courts have been uniformly troubled by this
"whipsaw effect," their response has varied greatly. For example, in East New Haven v. Eastern Airlines,52 an action which required the joinder of the Town of East New Haven, two airlines
and the administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, a Connecticut district court found the non-application of Section 1391 (e)
to actions in which all defendants were federal employees to be
"without justification where there [was] independent authority
for service of process and venue with respect to each non-government party joined as a defendant." 5' 3 Nevertheless, in the
light of what the court considered to be the unambiguous language of the statute, it felt compelled to sever the plaintiff's
action against the federal defendants. In Powelton Civic Home
Owners Association v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,5 4 however, the district court thought that it was
"absurd to conclude that the operative force of [Section 1391 (e)
was] abrogated by the presence of an additional defendant who
[could] be adequately served within the power of Rule 4 (f)."15
50. Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Department of Housing
& Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See Heath v. Aspen
Skiing Corp., 325 F. Supp. 223 (D. Colo. 1971); Macias v. Finch, 324
F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v.

Denver & R.G.W. R.R., 290 F. Supp. 612 (D. Colo. 1968). But see
Stinson v. Finch, 317 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1970); East New Haven v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 507 (D. Conn. 1968); Benson v. Minneapolis, 286 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1968); Chase Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 269 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Pa. 1967).

51. Powelton Civil Home Owner's Ass'n v. Department of Housing
See 2 J. MooRE,

& Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
FEDERAL PRACTICE
4.29, at 1209-10 (2d ed. 1966).
52. 282 F. Supp. 507 (D. Conn. 1968).

53.

Id. at 511.

54.

284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).

55.

Id. at 834.
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It interpreted the relevant language of Section 1391 (e) to mean
that the extra-territorial service of process provision was available only when each defendant who could not otherwise be
served under Federal Rule 4(f) was a federal officer.56
It is difficult to harmonize the cases which allow the use of
Section 1391(e) in actions where there is joinder of non-federal
defendants with the unambiguous statutory language. But, absent a vital federal interest, it is more difficult to rationalize why
Congress would have intended to distinguish plaintiffs whose
action required the joinder of non-federal defendants and
thereby jeopardize their cause of action. The burden placed on
the Department of Justice by having to defend an action in
which there are additional parties cannot be compared with the
burden placed on the plaintiff who is left with no forum in which
to redress his grievances. 57 Thus, in spite of the interest of the
Justice Department in controlling the joinder of additional parties, the view of the court in Powelton is preferable to a more
literal reading of the statute because it prevents the Government
from obtaining what is in effect a de facto procedural immunity
from suit under the guise of control of litigation for its own
convenience in resolving federal interests.
B.

DEFINITION OF

FEDEAL

OFFICER OR AGENCY

The judicial interpretations which limit the availability of
Section 1391(e) to actions against federal defendants who serve
administrative functions, like those which allow the use of the
statute when federal and non-federal defendants are joined in
the same action, are based on the statute's legislative history
rather than on language in the statute itself. Both the House
and Senate reports stated that "officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity"
should be taken to mean an employee of "any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, board, or bureau of the United States, or any corporation in which the
United States has a proprietary interest." 8 Despite this broad
56.

Id.

57. One commentator has suggested that if the "each defendant"
limitation is read literally, one result will be that a plaintiff would
have no forum in which to challenge the failure of the government to
lease federal land to him rather than to someone else, because the
party to whom the land actually was leased would be as indispensable
as the Secretary of the Interior. Cramton, supra note 1, at 464.
58. S. REP., supra note 40, at 4; H.R. Rzp., supra note 39, at 4.
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language, some courts have removed employees who are not
working for an independent agency or the executive branch of
the Government from the scope of the statute.50
The justification for excluding officers of the judicial and
legislative branches from the reach of 1391(e) is that the statute
was adopted primarily because of the difficulty of reviewing administrative determinations under the general federal question
venue statute. 60 Because the federal judiciary and members of
Congress only infrequently make decisions that are reviewable
in the sense that an administrative determination is subject to
judicial review, it is arguable that Section 1391(e) is not meant
to apply to such officials absent specific mention of them in the
statute's legislative history. 61
The only case in which the issue of the applicability of Section 1391(e) to non-administrative employees has arisen is Liberation News Service v. Eastland.62

In that case the plaintiffs 5

sought to quash subpoenas issued by the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary which
had ordered the plaintiffs' bank to disclose records relating to
their bank accounts. Named as defendants were all the members
of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security and its chief
counsel, none of whom were amenable to suit in the Southern
District of New York unless Section 1391(e) applied, and the
plaintiffs' bank, the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company. 4
After a careful review of the legislative history of Section
1391(e), the Second Circuit dismissed the action for improper
venue and lack of personal jurisdiction over the Subcommittee
members and chief counsel. The Mandamus and Venue Act of
1962 had been passed with two sections, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 which
gave the district courts mandamus power, and Section 1391 (e)
which liberalized venue and service of process when the defendant was a federal employee. Thus, the court reasoned that
it was probable that Congress meant the new venue and service
59.

See, e.g., Liberation News Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379

(2d Cir. 1970).
60.

S. REP. at 1, 2.

61.

See note 69 infra.

62.

426 F.2d 1379 (2d Cir. 1970).

63. Plaintiffs were the Liberation News Service which described
itself as "a wire service to the radical and underground press," and
the New York Regional Office of Students for a Democratic Society,
"an association of young people of the left."
64. Although the court does not mention the issue, it is interesting
to note that in Liberation News Service both federal and nonfederal
defendants were named. See text accompanying notes 47-57, supra.
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of process provisions to apply only in actions against the kind of
government employees who could be compelled to perform duties owed to a plaintiff by way of mandamus. The court did not
believe that a member of Congress could be so compelled! 0
The Second Circuit's attempt to use the mandamus section
of the Mandamus and Venue Act to restrict the applicability of
the venue and service of process provisions of Section 1391(e) is
not clearly justified by the legislative history of the Act. As originally introduced, the bill was solely concerned with facilitating
judicial review of federal administrative action by liberalizing
venue and service of process. 6 The grant of mandamus power
to the district courts was added only after the Department of
Justice pointed out that the district courts would often find
themselves unable to give effective relief without such power in
07
the suits that they would now be able to hear.
But behind the court's decision was a far more basic consideration. The court realized that unlike many administrative
and executive actions where the disputed decision was often
made in the field, Congressional committees operated primarily
in the capital. It was afraid that the "disruption to the work of
Congress by the pendency of actions elsewhere than in Washington" would be far more serious than in the case of executive departments and agencies with their large and scattered staffs.08
Although the actions of a Congressman could admittedly cause
damage to citizens in distant areas of the country, the court
felt that in order to protect the easily inconvenienced legislative defendant, it was necessary that venue for actions against
him be controlled by the general federal venue statute rather
than by the more plaintiff oriented provisions of Section
1391(e).
Two points were made clear by the interpretation of Section 1391(e) in Liberation News Service. First, where the legislative history is not clear as to the applicability of the statute, 0
the court would resolve the ambiguity by balancing the convenience of the federal defendant against that of the citizen
65. 426 F.2d at 1384.
66. See text accompanying notes 29-34, supra.
67. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
68. 426 F.2d at 1384.
69. The court in Liberation News Service could find no "word in
the five year gestation period of § 1391 (e)" which indicated that Congress directly intended that the statute apply to legislative "employees." 426 F.2d at.1384.
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plaintiff. Second, it would give no less weight to the defendant's convenience merely because he was a government employee. Because the traditional definition of venue had been in
terms of the defendant's residence, the court held that Section
1391(e), which allowed for venue at the residence of the plaintiff, was to be narrowly construed.
C.

APPLICATIONS OF SECTION

1391 (e)

IN SITUATIONS

OTHER THAN THE PROTOTYPE

Neither the House nor the Senate reports suggest that the
availability of Section 1391(e) depends on the district of residence of the federal defendant.70 However, some courts have
used the balancing criteria of Liberation News Service to determine whether the liberalized venue and service of process provisions of Section 1391(e) are available in two situations. First,
the test has been used when a superior or other indispensable
official resides outside of the district in which the action is
brought but not in the District of Columbia. Second, it has also
been used when the local defendant is only a nominal party, the
action being brought in a forum favorable for the plaintiff but
where neither the cause of action arose, nor where the plaintiff
or the "actual" defendant reside.
1. Local Agencies
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,7 1 three environmental protection organizations 2
brought suit in the District Court for the Southern District of

New York seeking both declaratory relief and an injunction
prohibiting the Tennessee Valley Authority and its chairman
from purchasing strip mined coal from producers in the Tennessee-Kentucky region. 73 Defendants objected to the New York
venue, arguing, inter alia,74 that Section 1391(e) was not meant
70. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
71. 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972).
72. Plaintiffs were the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., a
New York membership corporation having its principal place of business in the Southern District of New York; the Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc., a New York membership corporation having its principal
place of business in the Eastern District of New York; and the Sierra
Club, a California membership corporation having its principal place of
business in the Northern District of California.
73. The complaint alleged that the defendant violated various federal statutes and regulations by pursuing its "policy of purchasing and
burning huge quantities of strip-mined coal." Id. at 256.
74. Among the other objections was that section 8(a) of the Ten-
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to apply to an action against a regionally based federal business
corporation such as the TVA. Looking to the legislative history
of Section 1391(e), the Second Circuit noted that the problem of
the indispensable superior had been a bar to convenient suit primarily in cases of agencies headquartered in the District of Columbia. Thus, the court concluded that this problem did not
make the "essentially local", albeit federal, TVA subject to suit
outside of the area of its activity!Y Further, the court reasoned
that the TVA had always been suable subject to the same venue
limitations as any other corporation and that "[u]nlike the local
postmaster or federal land agent... could never have defeated
venue... on a plea that the suit would lie only in the District

of Columbia

.

... " 6

The Second Circuit thus rejected the

plaintiffs' more general contention that it had been the intent of
Congress to make all federal agencies uniformly suable anywhere in the United States that a plaintiff might reside.
Although the Second Circuit emphasized the uniqueness of
the Tennessee Valley Authority, stating that it "operates in much
the same way as an ordinary business corporation, under the
control of its directors in Tennessee, and not under that of a cabinet officer or independent agency headquartered in Washington," 77 the court's reasoning extends naturally to situations other
than the narrow area of federal business corporations. Indeed,
the reasoning affirms the rationale of the earlier federal district
court decision, Holicky v. Selective Service Local Board No. 3,78
in which the plaintiff challenged a military induction order originated by his Illinois draft board in a district court in Colorado,
the district of his residence. Although the plaintiff in Holicky
was a resident of Colorado and was to be inducted there, the
court found that his draft board in Illinois was an indispensable
party since he was under the control of the Colorado board only
because of the induction ordered in Illinois. In considering the
availability of Section 1391(e), the court asserted that the most
plausible view of what Congress intended when it amended the
venue provisions was that citizens should be able to bring suit
elsewhere than in the District of Columbia only against officials
nessee Valley Authority Act was a special venue statute within the
meaning of the "except as otherwise provided by law" limitation on the
availability of section 1391(e). Although the court discussed this aspect, it was not the basis for the court's decision.
75. 459 F.2d at 259.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 257.
78. 328 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Colo. 1971).
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of "national" as opposed to "merely local" stature.70 Since the
Illinois draft board was "merely local", the court held that Section 1391(e) was unavailable to the plaintiff.
The contention of the plaintiff in both Holicky and Natural
Resources Defense Council was that a basic purpose of Section
1391(e) was to make the location of a lawsuit turn primarily on
the plaintiff's convenience in any case in which the defendant
was a federal officer or agency. Both the Colorado District
Court and the Second Circuit rejected this broad reading. Rather,
the courts held, in effect, that the legislation which became Section 1391(e) had the narrow purpose of remedying the restraint
on judicial review of federal administrative action which was
present in the prototype fact situation that had led to its passage. In reaching their conclusion, both courts focused on the
lack of any affirmative evidence that Congress had intended to
abrogate the more traditional conception of venue as protection
for the defendant against suit in a distant forum, when it allowed
venue in the district of the plaintiff's residence. The court in
Holicky expressed concern that had Congress considered the situation, it might have concluded that draft boards would be "unfairly burdened" if they were forced to defend law suits in the
district of a registrant's residence because at the "restless age of
majority," registrants were "apt to be scattered far and wide."8 0
In Natural Resources Defense Council the Second Circuit was
fearful that if all federal agencies were uniformly suable in any
district in which a plaintiff might reside, "today's liberalized notions of standing" could subject an essentially local agency to
suit in any federal district "from Maine to Hawaii or from Alaska
to Florida" which was the residence of an organization claiming
the right to sue."'
The decisions in Holicky and in Natural Resources Defense
Council by no means announced unanimously held interpretations of Section 1391 (e). For example, in Ellingburg v. Connett,8 2 the Fifth Circuit held that a prisoner in a federal penitentiary could sue his warden in the Northern District of Texas,
the district of the prisoner's residence before incarceration, even
though the prison was located in, and the warden was a resident
79. Id. at 1375.
80. Id.
81. 459 F.2d at 259.
82. 457 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Nestor v. Hershey, 425
F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
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of, the Eastern District of Texas. A vigorous dissent, on the
other hand, agreed with the courts in Holicky and Natural Resources Defense Council that Section 1391 (e) had only been
adopted to solve the indispensable superior problem, and that
therefore Congress did not intend that "federal prison authorities would have to chase all over the United States at the whim
'8 3
of the prisoner.., to defend such suits.
One possible explanation for the result in Ellingburg is that
the absent indispensable defendant was a resident of a district
near the district in which the action was brought. However, in
Nestor v. Hershey, 4 the D.C. Circuit allowed a plaintiff to use
Section 1391(e) to bring a Missouri draft board before a court
in the District of Columbia. The trouble with Nestor and other
cases consonant with Ellingburgis that they do not go beyond the
literal language of the statute; they do not address themselves to
the central question of whether Congress intended that the convenience of the citizen-plaintiff always be given preference over
that of the government defendant. To some extent, the answer
has depended on the willingness of an individual court to disregard the literal language of the statute and use the legislative
history of the Mandamus and Venue Act, read in the light of the
traditional reasons for the existence of venue provisions, as a general interpretive tool.
2. Actions in the FieldAgainst a Nominal Defendant
The problems generated by the liberal interpretation of Section 1391(e) adopted by the courts in Ellingburg and Nestor are
best illustrated in Kings County Economic Community Dev.
85
Ass'n v. Hardin.
The plaintiffs in Kings County brought an
action against officials of the Department of Agriculture and the
Federal Water Quality Administration, alleging that federally
subsidized agricultural operations in the district of their own
residences in California were causing serious pollution of water
83. 457 F.2d at 242.
84. 425 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Nestor, the plaintiff was attempting to join the Director of the Selective Service and draft boards
from Maryland and Missouri in an action brought in the District Court
for the District of Columbia. The case differs from Ellingburg in
that venue was set in Washington under the "district of the defendant's
residence" clause of section 1391 (e) (the Director of the Selective Service
was a Washington resident) rather than under the "plaintiff's residence"
clause. However, there is no reason that this distinction should affect
the availability of section 1391 (e).
85. 333 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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supplies.8 6 Although the activity complained of affected only
that district, the action was brought in a different California
district with venue based on the fact that the Department of Agriculture maintained a regional office there whose director was
included as a nominal defendant.
The court, however, summarily dismissed the possibility
that Section 1391(e) allowed venue to be set in any district in
which the defendant maintained an office and ordered the action
transferred to the district of the plaintiff's residence. It felt that,
if the position urged by the plaintiffs were adopted, the Government would "now [be] deemed to be ubiquitous and that quite
apart from the provisions [of Section 1391 (e) ] about the location
of real property and the residence of plaintiffs, all that really
need be done to sue in any district in the United States [would
be] to name as 'a defendant' a subordinate departmental official
residing there. '1 7 The court refused to believe that there was no
need to allege that such official "would have discretion to do as
plaintiffs pray or that he would play any role in administering
the relief requested" or indeed, to allege that he ever had anything to do with the suit at all. 88 Thus, the court held that it
was impossible to set venue in any district merely by naming a
government officer residing therein as a nominal defendant.
3.

Criticisms of the Interpretations Given Section 1391(e) in
Non-Habeas Proceedings

What disturbed the court in Kings County was a variation of
the same problem that disturbed the courts in Holicky 9 and in
Natural Resources Defense Council:0 0 if the government defendant was suable in any district in which any plaintiff resided
or in which the defendant maintained subordinate employees,
the federal venue statutes would become a device for allowing
the plaintiff to choose not only the most convenient forum, but
also the one most favorable for himself. However, the courts in
Natural Resources Defense Council, Holicky, and Kings County
failed to examine four significant factors which make their con86. The relief requested was an order that would compel the
Secretary of Agriculture to consider the relationship between forms of
environmental pollution and the federal farm subsidy program.
87. 333 F. Supp. at 1304 (emphasis in original).
88. Id.
89. See note 78 supra.
90. See note 71 supra.
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clusion that Section 1391(e) was meant only to apply to the
prototype fact situation less compelling.
First, although the Senate Committee on the Judiciary did
warn that the Mandamus and Venue Act would "not give access
to the Federal courts to an action which [could not already] be
brought... in the ... District of Columbia,"' D it is not clear
that the Committee meant the warning to be taken as a venue
limitation. The position of the Department of Justice was that,

as originally written, the mandamus section of the Act could be
mistakenly interpreted so as to give the federal courts the power
to review discretionary decisions made by federal administrative

officers. 92 Viewed in this light, it is probable that the warning
meant only that the section of the Act which became 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 should not extend the power to review administrative
determinations beyond the power to issue writs of mandamus already enjoyed by the District Court for the District of Columbia.
It did not, therefore, mean to limit venue in the field to fact situ-

ations which would also have supported venue in Washington,
D.C.

Second, the courts did not account for the Congressional

realization9 3 that considerations of the potential inconvenience
to the defendant of having to defend in any district 9 4 did not
really apply to a federal defendant represented by the Department of Justice which maintained United States Attorneys in every district. Because actions against federal agencies were "in
essence against the United States" and because they would be
defended by the Justice Department, it was the position of both
Houses that "[r] equiring the Government to defend [actions in
the field] would not appear to be a burdensome imposition."90
Third, the courts neglected to consider the availability of the
principle of forum non conveniens embodied in 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a), the change of venue statute.98 If the choice of venue
made by the plaintiff was unduly inconvenient for the other
parties or for witnesses, or if it offered the plaintiff some other
91. S. REm., supranote 40, at 2.
92. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
94. See General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & U.S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261,
275 (1922), where the Court held that the purpose of the general federal
venue provisions was to "save defendants from inconveniences to which
they might be subjected if they could be compelled to answer in any
district." See note 11 supra.
95. S. R '., supra note 40, at 3; H.IM Rms., supra note 39, at 3.
96. See note 8 supra.
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"local" advantage, the action could be transferred to any other
district in which venue was proper regardless of whether the
97
plaintiff objected.
Fourth, as evidenced by the Second Circuit's discussion of
"today's liberalized notions of standing,"9 8 the courts did not
deal adequately with the interrelationship between venue and
the advancing trends in other areas of the law, particularly the
area of standing to challenge administrative action. The requirements for standing to review a federal administrative determination are minimal. The plaintiff must have been injured
in fact by the governmental activity complained of,99 and must
arguably have been in the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee that he alleges
to have been violated. 10 0 Addressing itself to the kind of interests
and the level of injury necessary to confer standing in the
recent case of Sierra Club v. Morton,'01 the Supreme Court held
that more than the "special interest in conservation" claimed by
an environmental protection organization was necessary to enable
it to challenge the construction of a ski resort in a remote mountain valley.' 0 2 But the Court stated that injury to the "aesthetic
well-being" of any specific member or members of the organization who had actually used and supposedly would continue to use
the valley in a manner inconsistent with the proposed development was injury sufficient to confer standing. 08 Thus, under
97. See, e.g., Independent Fish Co. v. Phinney, 252 F. Supp. 952

(W.D. Tex. 1966).

98.

See text accompanying note 80 supra.

99.

See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).

100. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970).

101.

405 U.S. 727 (1972).

102. Id. at 738. See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).

103.

The Court pointed out:
The injury alleged by the Sierra Club will be incurred entirely by reason of the change in the uses to which Mineral King
will be put, and the attendant change in the aesthetics and
ecology of the area .... We do not question this this type of
harm may amount to an "injury in fact" sufficient to lay the
basis for standing .... But the "injury in fact" test requires
more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that
the party seeking review be himself among the injured.
T..
he Sierra Club failed to allege that it
or its members
would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes ....
405 U.S. at 734-35. But the Court also suggested that had the Sierra
Club alleged that any of its members would be injured, it would have
had standing. Id. at 735-36 n.8.
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this case a group like the Sierra Club has standing to review
governmental activity that takes place thousands of miles away
from the residence of any of its members if it can allege that a
member has occasionally used the area affected by the activity
and would prefer that it remain inviolate for future use.
But there is no reason to restrict the availability of Section
1391 (e) merely because a plaintiff is permitted to bring an action in a district which is some distance from the district in
which the activity complained of took place. If the distant
plaintiff-has standing to sue a local agency such as the TVA, it
is because the agency's localized activities are detrimental to legally cognizable rights of the plaintiff even though the plaintiff
does not live in the area immediately affected by the activity.
As the requirements for standing are liberalized, it becomes increasingly important that the plaintiff be allowed to bring his
action in a forum in which the cost of prosecution does not render the ability to bring the action illusory. Restricting the
availability of venue provisions because of "liberalized notions
of standing" is an unnecessarily rigid means of protecting the
convenience of the federal defendant. By reading Section 1391 (e)
narrowly, courts do not recognize the possibility that even
though the ruling will in some cases validly spare the federal
defendant from the hardship of defending in a distant forum,
in other cases it will give the agency de facto immunity from
suit by plaintiffs who do not have the financial resources to pursue an action against a distant government officer when the government officer would not be inconvenienced at all.
The major flaw with a narrow interpretation of Section
1391(e) is that it limits flexibility in actions against federal officials when it is clear that flexibility was a major consideration
in the statute's adoption. A better interpretation would result
from admitting that the Government can effectively defend an
action against a federal employee wherever it is brought because
of the existence of United States Attorneys in every district
Any real hardship that results from holding that the Government is ubiquitous can be alleviated by transfer under the
change of venue statute if such transfer is truly in the "inter10 4
ests of justice."'

D. PETIIONS FOR A WRIT OF HABEAs CoRPus
Although use of the liberalized venue and service of process
104.

See note 8 supra.

1028

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1005

provisions of Section 1391(e) has been made in suits for mandamus, 10 5 injunction, 10 6 and declaratory judgment °7 on the basis
that they are "civil actions" within the meaning of the statute,
it is not clear that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be
similarly treated. There are two traditional requirements that
must be met under the federal habeas corpus law before the writ
can issue: 1) the body must be "in custody" within the territorial jurisdiction of the court ordering the writ,108 and 2) the
court must acquire personal jurisdiction over the custodian.10
The problem in applying Section 1391(e) to habeas corpus actions arises largely from the second requirement. Although
many of the habeas corpus actions requiring interpretation of
the statute have presented intricate questions as to when and
where a plaintiff was in "custody," the attempted use of Section
1391 (e) was to be a means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over
an absent custodian.
In the normal habeas corpus situation where a prisoner brings
suit against his warden, there is no problem of obtaining personal
jurisdiction over the custodian because he and his prisoner are
in close proximity to each other. Therefore, Section 1391 (e) has
been used only in situations where military personnel, away
from their units for some reason, attempt to use habeas corpus
to gain release from the military by bringing suit against their
absent commanding officer. 110 In United States ex rel. Rudick
105.

See, e.g., Still v. Commanding Officer, 334 F. Supp. 617 (N.D.

Ala. 1971).
106. See, e.g., Montilla v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 1063 (D.P.R. 1971).
107. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 303 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Mich.
1969).
108. The requirement that the body be "in custody" within the
jurisdiction of the court ordering the writ was the position of the majority opinion in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948). Dicta in Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487 (1971), cast some doubt as to the rigor of
this requirement. See also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of
Kentucky, 41 U.S.L.W. 4329 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1973), in which the Court
held that petitioner, imprisoned in Alabama but subject to a detainer
issued by a Kentucky court, could bring a habeas corpus action in
Kentucky in order to force a speedy trial there.
109. See Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
110. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16
(2d Cir. 1969) (soldier on leave); Switkes v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 358
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (soldier on leave); United States ex rel. Armstrong v.
Wheeler, 321 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (unattached reservist). Although none of the courts holding that habeas corpus is a civil action
within the meaning of section 1391(e) discusses the matter, they indi-
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v. Laird,"' the first reported habeas corpus action employing
Section 1391(e), the Second Circuit held that the statute did not
allow a district court in New York to obtain personal jurisdiction
over the absent "custodians" 2 who had been served with process
by registered mail in the District of Columbia. The court reasoned
that Section 1391(e) was concerned solely with venue. For the
court to have personal jurisdiction over the custodians, they
would have to be "found" in New York for the purpose of service of process.
But the court's classification of Section 1391(e) as solely a
venue statute is not compelling since it clearly does allow a court
to obtain personal jurisdiction over an absent party.1' 3 If the
only impediment blocking an action for habeas corpus against
an absent custodian is the inability of the court to effectuate personal jurisdiction over him, Section 1391 (e)makes the action possible by providing for nationwide service of process by registered mail. As a result, the district courts in other circuits in
United States ex Tel. Lohmeyer v. Laird' 4 and United States ex
tel. Armstrong v. Wheeler" 5 did not follow Rudick when faced
with similar fact situations, and reached the opposite result. The
court in Armstrong felt that the decision in Rudick had been
overruled by the Second Circuit's later opinion in Liberation
News Service v. Eastlandwhich explicitly held that Section 1391
(e) gave a court in the field personal jurisdiction over a federal
officer residing in another district."6 The court in Lohmeyer, in
a decision prior to Liberation News Service, simply did not cite
Rudick in discussing the jurisdictional question.
In Switkes v. Laird,17 a New York district court attempted to
reconcile Liberation News Service and Rudick. An action for a
writ of habeas corpus had been brought by a military doctor
who claimed to be a conscientious objector. Named as defendants were the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the
Army. In dismissing the action, the court explained that whereas
rectly hold that the statute is not to be narrowly read so as to apply
only to the indispensable superior prototype.

111. 412 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1969).

112. The court expressed some doubt whether or not the named
defendants were the plaintiff's custodians, and whether the plaintiff,
who was absent without leave, was in "custody" at all
113. See authority cited in note 46 supra.
114. 318 F. Supp. 94 (D.Md. 1970).
115. 321 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
116. 426 F.2d 1379 (2d Cir. 1970). See note 46 supra.
117. 316 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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Section 1391(e) would normally grant personal jurisdiction over
an absent federal officer, the court in Rudick had found that
habeas corpus was not a "civil action" as those words were used
in the statute. In support of its position, the court pointed out
that "[w]hile habeas corpus is often said to be 'civil,' the Supreme Court has said that this label is 'gross and inexact' and
that 'the proceeding is unique.'"118 However, the court did not
state clearly what the uniqueness was that prevented habeas
corpus from being a "civil action."
The uniqueness of habeas corpus was confirmed when the
Supreme Court was confronted with the issue in Schlanger v.
Seamans,119 but the badly needed clarification was not forthcoming. Schlanger was an Air Force enlistee who had been assigned to do permissive temporary duty at Arizona State University while completing a university degree. Alleging that his
contract of enlistment had been violated, he sought habeas corpus from a district court in Arizona in a suit which named as
defendants the Secretary of the Air Force; the Commander of
Moody Air Force Base, Georgia (Schlanger's commanding officer); and the Commander of the Air Force ROTC program at
Arizona State University. Because the Commander of the Arizona State University ROTC program had no actual control over
the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held that no custodians were
present in Arizona and therefore the action could not be maintained. The possibility that Section 1391(e) could supply jurisdiction over the absent custodians was dismissed in a footnote
which repeated the suggestion of the Switkes court that although habeas corpus was technically a civil suit, it was "not
automatically subject to all the rules governing ordinary civil
0
actions."12
The position of the Supreme Court in Schlanger was based
largely upon the Court's earlier opinion in Ahrens v. Clark'2' in
which a divided court held that the statute which authorized
district court judges to order habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions"'122 made habeas corpus power "territorial."
But the Court in Ahrens had really been concerned only with the
first jurisdictional requirement for habeas corpus, that the
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 362.
401 U.S. 487 (1971).
Id. at 490 n.4.
335 U.S. 188 (1948).

122. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
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"body" be in custody within the territorial boundaries of the
jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. 1 23 In using Ahrens to
support the holding that the custodian must also be present
within the jurisdiction in which the habeas corpus action is
brought, the Supreme Court in Schlanger did not clarify whether
the custodian's presence was a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, or merely that habeas corpus actions were subject to special service of process requirements that left a court without
One diffipersonal jurisdiction over an absent custodian.12 4
culty with either reason for the strictly territorial definition of
habeas corpus is that the policy considerations which led the
Ahrens majority to conclude that habeas corpus was territorial
were not necessarily applicable to the question of jurisdiction
over the custodian. The Court's opinion in Ahrens suggested
that it would take "compelling reasons to conclude that Congress
contemplated the production of prisoners from remote sections,
perhaps thousands of miles from the District Court that issued
the writ.' 12- 5 However, the interest of the federal custodian in
not being required to defend a habeas corpus action at a distant
forum is not stronger than the interest of an ordinary federal
officer in any other kind of action who is protected by venue
and service of process provisions. Thus, there is no reason to
treat the restriction of the habeas corpus power of district judges
to "their respective jurisdictions" as a limitation as to subject
matter jurisdiction. Unless the language means that there is a
special personal jurisdiction requirement embodied in the habeas corpus statute which survived the passage of the Mandamus
and Venue Act, there is no reason to conclude that Section
1391(e) cannot be used to obtain personal jurisdiction.
The most recent Supreme Court opinion on the subject indirectly suggests that the restriction results from the inability of a
court to obtain personal jurisdiction over the custodian. In Strait
123. Plaintiffs in Ahrens were some 120 Germans who were detained on Ellis Island, New York, awaiting deportation. They brought
an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia, naming the
United States Attorney General as defendant. The only question before
the court was whether Washington, D.C., was a proper jurisdiction
for the plaintiffs' petition given that they were not in custody within the
territorial boundaries of the jurisdiction.
124. The distinction is critical Section 1391(e) makes no pretext
of conferring subject matter jurisdiction on a court, but it can be used
to bring a party before the court over whom the court otherwise lacked
personal jurisdiction.
125. 335 U.S. at 191.
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v. Laird,1 20 the Court held that a California district court had
jurisdiction to hear a habeas corpus action brought by a reservist against the Commanding Officer of the Reserve Officer Components Personnel Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. The
Court did not base its decision on the availability of Section
1391 (e) to obtain jurisdiction over the Commanding Officer (who
was really only in charge of keeping records on reserve personnel). Instead, it chose to use the extent to which the officer
used military intermediaries in California in his dealings with
the plaintiff as evidence that he was present in California for
the purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding. The plaintiff in
Strait was distinguished from the plaintiff in Schlanger by the
difference between their relationships with their respective commanding officers. Whereas Schlanger had always dealt directly
with his commander in Georgia and had never had any contact
with him through Arizona intermediaries, Strait never had any
direct contacts with his commanding officer. All communication was through intermediaries in California. By focusing on
the contacts between the custodian and California, the court implied that it was the inability to obtain personal jurisdiction over
the absent custodian that normally made habeas corpus impossible when the custodian was not present in the district in which
the action was brought.
If the requirement that the custodian be present in the jurisdiction in which the habeas corpus action is brought means only
that there are special requirements for personal jurisdiction over
him, the court's reasoning must be that those requirements have
survived the adoption of the extra-territorial service of process
provision of Section 1391 (e) and are included within the "except
as otherwise provided by law" language of the statute. But if
any such personal jurisdiction requirement embodied in the habeas corpus statute exists, it exists only by implication from the
basic terms of the habeas statute. Even if such implication is
well founded, the legislative history of Section 1391 (e) suggests
that "except as otherwise provided by law" refers to certain
special venue statutes where the limitations are explicit, such
as provisions controlling the location for proceedings brought
with respect to federal taxes and actions relating to immigration
27
matters.
Thus, there seems to be no reason why Section 1391 (e) is not
126. 406 U.S. 341 (1972).

See also Arlen v. Laird, 451 F.2d 684 (2d

Cir. 1971).
127. S. REP., supra note 40, at 4.
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available for habeas corpus petitions. In the most frequent habeas situation, where a prisoner attempts to obtain release from
prison, the proper defendant, the prison warden, will always be
present in the jurisdiction in which the prisoner is in custody.
Therefore, he will always be present in the district in which
the action is maintained and the use of Section 1391(e) will not
be necessary to obtain personal jurisdiction over him. Where
the plaintiff is a member of the armed forces who is separated
from his commanding officer, two factors make the availability
of the extra-territorial service of process provision of Section
1391(e) desirable. First, as in Strait v. Laird, the commanding
officer may often be only a nominal party who will never be
called to testify. Second, even if the commanding officer has
active control over the plaintiff, the burden placed on him by
requiring him to defend an action in a distant forum is no greater
than the burden placed on any other federal defendant who is
suable in the field because of the existence of Section 1391(e).
IV. CONCLUSION
The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 was introduced and
finally adopted to allow a plaintiff to obtain judicial review of
a federal administrative determination in the field when a superior residing in Washington was indispensable. However,
there is no reason to limit the availability of Section 1391(e) to
that prototype situation. The presence of United States Attorneys in every district makes it relatively unnecessary to use
venue provisions to protect federal officers from suit in distant
forums. In addition, the availability of the principle of forum
non conveniens embodied in the change of venue statute is protection enough against "forum shopping" by the plaintiff.
Although the Supreme Court has not fully articulated its
reasons, the special requirements for jurisdiction over the custodian seem to make Section 1391(e) useless in habeas corpus
actions. However, the failure of the Court in Strait v. Laird to
mention the statute at all is troublesome. The opinion seemed
to indicate that the requirement that the custodian be present
in the district in which the habeas corpus action was brought
was a matter of personal jurisdiction over him which should
have opened the way for the application of Section 1391 (e). But
by reaching the same result which would have been reached by
the application of Section 1391 (e) without mentioning the statute, the Court seems to continue to reject its use.

